Signaling: Suppose that there are two types of workers in the world: Charlie Hustles, who are high- productivity workers, and Lazy Susans, who are low-productivity workers. The market would pay Pc = $75,410 (this and all numbers in this question are in present value terms) to hire a Charlie Hustle, but only PL = $34,853 to hire a Lazy Susan. The problem, of course, is that a firm cannot tell on sight whether a job applicant is a Charlie or a Susan. One way to attempt to separate the Chucks and the Suzies is to require a college degree. It is easy for a Charlie Hustle to obtain a degree (the degree takes four years to complete and takes $Cc = 40, 189 worth of effort). It is harder for a Lazy Susan to obtain a degree (six years and takes CL = $40,320 worth of effort). Assume that a college education adds nothing to either worker's productivity. Suppose that the firms pay Pc = $75,410 to anyone with a college degree and PL = $34, 853 to anyone who does not have a college degree. (a) What are Charlies net benefits from attending college, what are their net benefits from not attending college, will Charlies attend college? (b) What are Susans net benefits from attending college, what are their net benefits from not attending college, will Susans attend college? (c) Does this payment strategy sort Charlie Hustles from Lazy Susans? (d) Is there an amount of money that firms could pay college graduates (Pe) so that Charlie Hustles go to college and Lazy Susans do not?