please answer question 2 by taking the two-player game (a) in question 1 not (b) !! Question 1. 15 points Answer the following questions for each of the games below a How many stategies (complete plans of action are available to each player? List all the possible strategies for each player. b Identify the rollback equilibrium outcone and the optimal strategy to each player (a) 3.0 MINERVA MINERVA ALBUS (b} MINERVA N ALBUS ALBUS MINERVA 3. (e) 11.1 RLSU SEVERUS 2.40 0,23 WINERVA ALOUS Question2.15 points For the two-player game (a) in the previous question a Write the game in strategic form,making Alubs the Row player and Minerva the Column player. Find all Nash equilibria b For those equilibria you foumd in part (A of this question that are not subgame-perfect,identify the reason.