Two people caught by their teacher for vandalizing school property can either defect (turn the other person in) or cooperate with one another (denying what they did). The normal form representation of the one-shot game and the respective payoffs of each student are shown below. Student 2 Cooperate Defect Student 1 3,3 1,4 Cooperate Defect 4,1 2,2 (i) How are games with this payoff structure generally called in the literature and explain whether the jointly optimal outcome is a Nash equilibrium? If not, what is the Nash equilibrium? [4 marks] (ii) Let us assume that the one-shot game in (i) becomes a finite-horizon game played from periods 0 to k, where k>1. Additionally, let 8 € (0,1) be the discount factor. If both players employ a limited punishment strategy, under what condition would both players play (cooperate, cooperate) and not deviate? [15 marks] (iii) Assume that the finite-horizon game in (ii) is now an infinite horizon game. If both players play a grim strategy, under what values of & would collusion not be sustainable?